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The General Provisions of the Chinese Contract Law from a 
Scots Law Perspective 
 
Martin A. Hogg* 
 
A. Introduction 
 
I begin with an observation on the idea of a peculiarly Scottish perspective on Chinese 
contract law. I suspect that many Chinese lawyers assume (without ever being contradicted 
by English lawyers) that English law and UK law are one and the same. Some of the Chinese 
legal scholarship I have read certainly speaks of ‘UK law’ and ‘British law’ without 
differentiating between the three legal systems operating within the United Kingdom, those 
of England and Wales (a unified system), Northern Ireland, and Scotland. The last of these, 
the Scottish legal system, is not a wholly Common law system. As a mixed legal system, it 
has in some respects more affinity with Chinese law than it does with English law, although 
one finds very little, if any, mention of Scots law in Chinese comparative legal scholarship. It 
is their shared mixed legal nature which makes the contract law of the two systems especially 
interesting for comparative purposes. 
China has been characterised as a mixed legal system in which two prominent mixes 
are Civil Law and customary law,1 but there are also socialist and Common law influences. 
Scotland has a mixed system in which the Civil Law and the Common Law are the most 
important influences, though others have played a role too (including Nordic law,2 customary 
law, and the canon law, from the last of which Scotland got its general enforcement of 
unilateral promises).  
In the rules of both Chinese and Scots contract law one sees the mark of the Civilian 
and the Common law traditions. In Civilian terms, one finds in the Chinese Contract Law 
(‘CCL’) the principle of good faith (Article 6, and elsewhere), the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus (Articles 66–69), culpa in contrahendo (Articles 42–43), third party rights (Article 
64), and the actio pauliana (Articles 74–75), among others, and one does not find any 
requirement of consideration in order validly to contract; in Common law terms, the CCL has 
rules on anticipatory breach (Article 94(2)), fundamental or material breach (Article 94(4)), 
and foreseeability of loss as a break on recoverable damages (Article 113). In Scots law, one 
also finds a mixture of Civil and Common law rules, though historically the Civilian element 
was a little more muted: so there is no culpa in contrahendo, only a more limited remedy for 
wasted pre-contractual expenditure, and good faith plays a much more limited role; on the 
other hand, third party rights have long been established in Scots law. Some CCL and 
Scottish principles can be said to derive from both the Common and Civil law: freedom to 
contract is an obvious one, though general contractual enforcement in both of those legal 
families can be traced to a pacta sunt servanda approach which has its origins in the canon 
                                                     
* Professor of the Law of Obligations, University of Edinburgh School of Law, Scotland. Email: 
Martin.Hogg@ed.ac.uk.  
1 See for that classification: the University of Ottowa’s JuriGlobe World Legal Systems project: 
http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/sys-mixtes.php; also Esin Örücü, ‘What is a Mixed Legal 
System: Exclusion of Expansion?’ (2008) 12.1 Electronic J of Comp Law.  
2 The property law applicable in the Scottish islands of Orkney and Shetland includes recognition of ‘udal 
tenure’, a form of land tenure having an ancient Norse derivation. Orkney and Shetland were possessions of 
Norway until the late fifteenth century, some six hundred or so years after the establishment of the unified 
Kingdom of Scotland around 841.  
law.3 
The CCL does not alone constitute the entire corpus of general contract rules. The 
Supreme People’s Court (‘SPC’) has also adopted two binding Interpretations of Several 
Issues concerning the application of the CCL.4 The Interpretation instrument (No. 2) 
comprises thirty articles setting out the way in which the SPC will approach the resolution of 
certain contractual disputes. Article 2, for instance, provides that 
 
Where the parties did not conclude a contract in a written or verbal form, but it may 
be inferred from the civil conduct of both parties that both parties intended to 
conclude the contract, the people’s court may determine that the contract was 
concluded in ‘any other form’ as mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the 
Contract Law, unless it is otherwise provided for by law.  
 
The important articles of these interpretation instruments are often cited by the SPC in its 
decisions in relation to contract disputes. However, the focus of this chapter will be on the 
rules of the CCL itself.   
 The CCL has been described by one Chinese academic as ‘one of the best pieces of 
legislation among existing Chinese private laws’,5 particular praise being reserved for the 
General Part of the CCL (which is the focus of this chapter).6 As a pro-codifying Scots 
lawyer, I am generally envious of any legal system with a civil code, but this praiseworthy 
assessment needs to be tested. In the following discussion, I consider whether the general 
provisions of the CCL merit the high accolade given to them in the observation just quoted. 
Comparative observations are made by reference to Articles 1–8 of the General Part. Though 
these observations are often principally from the perspective of Scots law, some of what I 
discuss in relation to Scotland is also applicable to English law. 
 
B. Comparative observations on the General Provisions of the CCL7 
 
Article 1: This Law is enacted with a view to protecting the lawful rights and interests 
of contracting parties, maintaining social and economic order and promoting socialist 
modernisation. 
 
Scots contract law rules and principles also seek to protect the ‘lawful rights and interests of 
contracting parties’; indeed, that is the primary purpose of judicial enforcement of contracts. 
What rights and interests are ‘lawful’ may be debated: enforcement of performance of the 
contract according to its strict terms, or satisfactory redress for non-performance, is clearly 
the primary interest of each party (what can be called the ‘performance interest’). And in 
Scotland there is an emphasis on performance remedies, to a degree not mirrored in the 
                                                     
3 There are texts in the Corpus Iuris Canonici supporting universal contractual enforcement, for instance 
Gregor. IX, Lib. 1, TIT XXXV De Pactis cap 1: ‘all said peace should be preserved, pacts respected’; cap 3: 
‘one ought to conduct oneself with care, so that, that which is promised will be achieved’. See also the work of 
Cardinal Hostiensis, including his Summa aurea and Lectura.  
4 See Interpretation (No 1) of the SPC on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the CCL, in effect as of 
29 December 1999; Interpretation (No 2) of the SPC on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the CCL, 
in effect as of 13 May 2009. 
5 S Han, ‘A Snapshot of Chinese Contract Law from an Historical and Comparative Perspective’ in L Chen and 
C H van Rhee, Towards a Chinese Civil Code (2012) 235–255, at 253. 
6 By contract, the Special Part is described as ‘weak and poorly drafted’: ibid, at 253. 
7 Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People's Congress on March 15, 1999 and promulgated 
by Order No 15 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on March 15, 1999. 
Common law (e.g. specific implement is an ordinary and not exceptional remedy, available 
as of right). But there are other lawful interests served by contract law: for instance, the 
interest of each party in the co-operation of the other party to ensure the contract’s purposes 
are carried out (reflected in a term implied into contracts requiring mutual co-operation, 
which ensures that, to some extent, the parties are not seen merely as adversaries8), and 
perhaps also in not being subject to abusive enforcement of contract rights (though this is 
debateable, given the decision of the House of Lords in White & Carter (Councils) v 
McGregor9) and in being given a second chance to remedy defective performance, where 
possible (see Lindley Catering Co v Hibernian Football Club,10 discussed below).  
Does Scots contract law also have as a founding purpose the maintenance of social 
and economic order? Not explicitly (i.e. contract is perceived primarily as serving the 
interests of the parties and not society more widely), though one can argue that, by the courts 
upholding and enforcing bargains freely entered into by the parties, this has the secondary 
effect of supporting the flourishing of a market economy (social economic order) and hence 
of the general welfare: without contract law, there could be no freely undertaken commercial 
transactions, and so opportunities for wealth creation would be greatly curtailed. Scottish 
contract law also embodies values other than personal wealth-creation, and these can be seen 
as part of the socio-economic order: such values include equity and fairness (manifested in 
the content and application of certain default contract rules), honesty and fair-dealing, 
perhaps embodied in a wider idea of good faith (see the further discussion of good faith 
below), mutual exchange (in the law’s enforcement of onerous contracts), and 
benevolence/liberality (in the law’s enforcement of gratuitous contracts, and unilateral 
promises). So the self-interest of parties, directed at their own economic advancement, is not 
the only feature characterising the social economic order which contract principles and rules 
seek to advance in Scotland. 
Evidently, Scottish contract law does not, as a body of law, exist to promote ‘socialist 
modernisation’. However, there is no reason why specific contractual arrangements could not 
be used by individual parties to embody, as their freely chosen aims, socialist values or a 
socialist venture, perhaps a mutual society or commune established on socialist principles. A 
socialist framework is thus not a prohibited choice for parties to embody in their contract. But 
this would have to be the freely adopted choice of the parties, and in interpreting and 
applying any such contract the court would not be doing so in a socialist fashion. 
In Scotland, though the values and principles of contract law are not codified, those 
values – discernible through court judgments and academic literature – reflect the reality of 
legal and wider life. By contrast, I am sceptical as to whether ‘socialist modernisation’ is in 
reality a value which one can really see reflected in modern China. The economic and social 
modernisation which is discernible in the country seems to have more to do with 
urbanisation, economic expansion, and personal wealth creation, than it does with socialism.  
 
Article 2:  Contract, as referred to in this law, is an agreement whereby natural 
persons, legal persons or other organisations, as equal parties, establish, modify and 
extinguish relationships of civil rights and duties. 
 
Agreements concerning civil status such as marriage, adoption and guardianship are 
governed by other laws. 
                                                     
8 Scottish Power plc v Kvaerner Construction (Regions) Ltd 1999 SLT 721. 
9 [1961] UKHL 5, 1962 SC (HL) 1, [1962] AC 413.  
10 1975 SLT (Notes) 56. 
 Article 2 does a number of things. It separates off the rules of family law into a separate field 
of law, thus making clear that agreements relating to family arrangements, which might 
otherwise have been seen as ‘contracts’ governed by general contract law rules, are not 
governed by such general rules but by separate rules. Scots law does the same thing, and 
indeed it also treats other forms of agreement as sufficiently specialist in nature that they are 
not governed by general contract rules, e.g. the agreement between those establishing a 
company – constituted in the memorandum and articles of association – is governed by the 
rules of company law and not contract law, though the instruments in question can be seen as 
a form of statutorily mandated contract. It is noticeable that such a separation off of company 
law contracts is not also made in this Article, though it is clear that such a separation does 
exist given the existence in Chinese law of a separate Company Law of 2013 which deals 
with the requirements of articles of association.11 Other specialist areas of Scots contract law, 
for instance the laws concerning sale, hire, lease, employment, and so forth, while having 
their own special rules are nonetheless seen as also governed by general principles of contract 
law to the extent that these general principles do not conflict with the specialist rules 
applicable in each area. China too has some separate legal instruments dealing with particular 
contracts, e.g. its Labour Law of 1995 and Employment Contract Law of 2008.  
 The other important thing which Article 2 does is to specify the fundamental nature of 
contracts: they are agreements, specifically agreements establishing, modifying, or 
extinguishing a civil rights-duties relationship between parties. This matches reasonably well 
with the conception of the nature of contract in Scots law, which is seen as resting in the idea 
of an agreement between parties intended to give rise to rights and duties in civil law (often, 
though not necessarily, adopted through a process of offer and acceptance12). Authority for 
this may be found in academic writing (much of it of some antiquity) and in courts’ 
pronouncements on contract disputes. On this matter, not only is Scots law in agreement but 
so also are European legal systems generally, as may be seen in model legal instruments 
embodying a European understanding of the law across systems (such as the Principles of 
European Contract Law and the Draft Common Frame of Reference). The description of a 
‘relationships of civil rights and duties’ essentially identifies contract as one form of civil 
juristic act (or juridical act), i.e. an act recognised as having legal force. Such a concept is 
well-known in Civilian systems, and is beginning to find a clearer recognition in Scots law 
too.  
 A definition of contract as agreement-based is a deviation from the promissory 
conception of contract which remains quite prevalent in a number of Common law 
jurisdictions, including the US Common Law states. In such jurisdictions, alongside 
descriptions of contracts as enforceable agreements, one also finds statements that a contract 
is an exchange of promises or a promise in exchange for which some executed consideration 
has been received. The CCL eschews any promissory language, and so generally does Scots 
law. Because in Scotland there is a separate class of voluntary obligation called ‘promise’ (or 
‘unilateral promise’), Scots lawyers avoid using promissory language to describe contract; 
doing so would create confusion with the separate form of unilateral promissory liability. 
The one thing that is perhaps missing from the CCL’s agreement-based definition of 
                                                     
11 Promulgated 28 December 2013. 
12 Chinese contract law also relies on an offer and acceptance analysis in relation to contractual agreement: see 
Article 13 of the CCL. For case law applying this analysis, see for instance the decision of the Supreme People’s 
Court in Li Deyong v Chongqing Yunyang Sub-Branch of Agricultural Bank of China (29 September 2013), 
SPC Gazette, Issue 7, 2015.  
  
the nature of the contract is that it is not specified that the agreement must be intended by the 
parties to have the force of law, or – to put it another way – that in making the agreement the 
parties are demonstrating consent to be bound at law. That is a requirement which is 
conceived of as necessary in Scots law, a strong emphasis being placed on identifying the 
objective will of the parties to be bound at law to an agreement. This is consistent with the 
classification of contract in Scotland as a species of voluntary obligational relationship, i.e. 
one established as a result of the voluntas (free will) of the parties. The requirement that the 
agreement manifest the intention of the parties to be bound at law enables Scottish courts to 
deny legal effect to mere social arrangements (such as an ‘agreement’ to have dinner). The 
idea of an intention/consent to be bound is missing from Article 2, although one could 
describe both Articles 4 and Article 8 (discussed below) as fulfilling a similar role, Article 4 
providing for a will-based entitlement to enter into contracts, and Article 8 providing that 
contracts ‘concluded according to law’ are legally binding. One can extrapolate from these 
provisions, taken together with Article 2, that whether contracts are formed in writing or 
orally (and we learn from Article 10 that, in general, parties may choose whichever form they 
wish), the binding force of agreement is demonstrated from an expression of the will of the 
parties, either in oral or written form, that the agreement take legal effect as a contract.    
 
Article 3:  Contracting parties are equal in their legal status, and no party may impose 
his own will upon the other party.13 
 
In designating parties as being ‘equal in their legal status’ this Article is rather ambiguous in 
what it asserts. If it is asserting simply that parties are entitled to equal treatment before the 
law, i.e. that neither is to be given any preferential treatment by the courts, and that the rights 
of one party under a contract are of equal legal standing to the rights of the other, then the 
Article is wholly unexceptional in reflecting a basic tenet of the rule of law also applicable in 
Western legal systems. If, on the other hand, the Article is asserting that parties are of equal 
bargaining position, and cannot use any economic or other advantage they may have in 
trying to obtain a preferential deal for themselves, then what the Article is stating is 
noticeably different from the basic position adopted by Scottish contract law.  
Some scholars have argued that both of these aspects may be encompassed by Article 
3: so, Professor Mo Zhang has expressed the view that the equal status doctrine has three 
aspects to it, these being (1) equal capacity to undertake transactions, (2) equal treatment 
before the law, and (importantly) (3) ‘equality in negotiation’.14 On the other hand, Professor 
Bing Ling has asserted that equality in status ‘does not imply that the parties must be equal in 
their control of economic, social and intellectual resources, nor does it require that the 
contract concluded by the parties must be an exchange of equal value’,15 which rather 
suggests the Article is not concerned with an equality in bargaining position. He argues that 
what Article 3 is really asserting is only the freedom to compete on an equal footing in the 
marketplace, something which is an adjunct to the principle of voluntariness and so (in his 
opinion) would be better located within the text of Article 4. 
If the Article is intending to assert equality in bargaining position, then it must be 
observed that in Scots law there is no presumption that, or rule requiring that, parties enjoy an 
                                                     
13 Articles 3 and 4 of the CCL have their origin in Article 5 of the Economic Contract Law of 1981. Article 5 
provided that ‘In concluding an economic contract, the parties must follow the principles of equality and mutual 
benefit and agreement through consultation. No party may impose its own will on the other party, and no unit or 
individual may illegally interfere’. 
14 Mo Zhang, Chinese Contract Law: Theory and Practice (2006) 72–73. 
15 Bing Ling, Contract Law in China (2002) 42. 
equality in their bargaining position or, in consequence, in the content of the contract which 
they conclude. On the contrary, the classic contract law view of the parties’ positions is (with 
some rules softening the edges of this view) an adversarial one, with each conceived of as 
entitled to try and profit as much as possible out of the relationship, even at the expense of 
the other party. A party with a greater bargaining strength over the other is entitled to use it to 
persuade the other to accept less favourable terms than it might otherwise have accepted had 
it been in a stronger position, save to the extent that specific types of improper influence are 
forbidden at law. Such forbidden influence includes lying in order to persuade someone to 
contract or to contract on specific terms (fraud, misrepresentation), extorting a contractual 
advantage from another (extortion, force and fear), abusing a position of trust one holds in 
relation to another to derive an unwarranted advantage (undue influence), or tricking a weak-
minded party into contracting to its disadvantage (facility and circumvention). In addition to 
these common law doctrines, there is some statutory regulation of the negotiation and content 
of contracts, for instance in consumer protection legislation specifically designed to protect 
the typically weaker consumer, and in unfair contract terms legislation. But these are 
exceptions to the general rule that a party is free to derive the maximum benefit it can when 
negotiating and entering into a contract. Consistent with that view, there is no entitlement of 
courts to amend or terminate contracts simply because the relationship entered into is unequal 
or unbalanced as a result of the inequality of the bargaining power of the parties. The attempt 
of Lord Denning16 to construct a general doctrine of inequality of bargaining power in 
English contract law was disavowed by the House of Lords in its decision in National 
Westminster Bank plc v Morgan,17 and Lord Denning’s view was not adopted in Scotland. By 
contrast, and consistent with Article 3, Article 54 of the CCL allows a party to request a court 
to alter or rescind a contract which is ‘evidently unfair’ at the time of its conclusion. Such a 
general fairness based plea would not be maintainable before a Scottish court. 
 Some would argue that the traditional adversarial model of contract negotiation and 
formation is unfit for the modern age. Increasingly, it is argued that the principle of good 
faith ought to, and does, provide a basis for a more general regulation of parties’ conduct and 
rights, such that some imbalanced relationships can be subject to moderation by the courts. 
This is discussed more fully under reference to Article 6 below. The arguments about the 
desirable role of good faith in modern law have a connection with earlier natural law ideas 
about the equality of parties to contracts: in the Aristotelian legal and moral tradition, 
commutative justice required that there be an equality in parties’ relationships (including in 
their contracts). This ancient tradition was continued into early modern European legal 
scholarship, with examples of it being found in the writings of the Dutchman Hugo Grotius 
(who asserted that the law of nature enjoined that contracts are characterised by equality18) 
and of James Dalrymple (Lord Stair), Scotland’s most famous jurist. Stair, in discussing 
contracts of exchange, asserted that it was ‘the purpose of the contractors … to keep an 
equality in the worth and value of the things’19 exchanged. Statements such as these suggest 
that an equality in the substance of the parties’ positions should be maintained in contract.  
In fact, however, these natural law statements in both Grotius and Stair were a mere 
Aristotelian veneer: when each writer developed his thinking on the parties’ relative 
positions, the idea was advanced that what constitutes an equal exchange is whatever 
measure the parties freely choose for such exchange. So, Stair says ‘the equality required in 
                                                     
16 See Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1974] EWCA Civ 8.  
17 [1985] 1 All ER 821. 
18 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, II.xii.8–13. 
19 Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland, I.x.14. 
these contracts [of exchange], cannot be in any other rate than the parties agree on’.20 By the 
end of the seventeenth century, there was an emerging European and Scottish legal view that 
contract law could not generally police whether parties had received an equal exchange under 
their contracts: whatever the parties themselves decided was to be treated as an equality 
between them. That emerging view set the stage for a more aggressive, adversarial 
understanding of the relationship between negotiating parties.   
If Professor Ling is correct, and the idea of equality of the parties is no more than an 
adjunct to freedom to contract, one simply asserting that parties compete on an equal footing 
in the market place, then Article 3 is unexceptional and reflects the view of Scots law. If, on 
the other hand, it does more than this, and represents an attempt to provide a general control 
against abuses in the bargaining process, then there is some gulf here between the CCL and 
the more limited rules against unfair, exploitative conduct in Scots law.  
 
Article 4: Parties enjoy, according to law, the right to voluntarily conclude contracts, 
and no unit or individual may illegally intervene therein. 
 
Ignoring for a moment the somewhat cryptic ‘according to law’ caveat, this article confers on 
parties a right voluntarily to enter into contracts. The principle of respect for voluntariness 
found in this Article had already been embedded in Chinese law before the adoption of the 
CCL: it is found in Article 4 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's 
Republic of China (adopted in 1986), an article which has previously been cited by the courts 
as justification for allowing parties to enter into new sorts of contractual relationships, even 
where no existing provision of the law provided for the form of relationship in question.21  
So, there is a clearly conferred freedom to contract under the CCL. But this is not the 
same as freedom of contract. Freedom of contract is the principle that parties may freely 
determine the content of any contract which they enter into.22 Most legal systems purport to 
confer not just freedom to contract, but freedom of contract, though in reality the degree of 
legislative and judicial policing of the content of contracts in the modern world must raise a 
serious doubt as to whether freedom of contract as an idea can still realistically be maintained 
in a pure form (if indeed it was ever realistic to do so). 
So, this Article says nothing about freedom of contract, and scholarship suggesting it 
does has not paid sufficient attention to the distinction between freedom to contract and 
freedom of contract.23 Some Chinese scholars have noted this, and have argued that the 
reference in the Article to voluntariness is deliberately not a reference to freedom of contract 
(indeed, an early draft of the Article, which used the language of freedom of contract, was 
                                                     
20 Ibid.  
21 See Huitong Sub Branch v Fulida Co (16 December 1997), SPC Gazette, Issue 2, 1998 (decision of the 
Higher People’s Court of Heilongjiang Province). The principle has also been applied to circumstances where a 
party decided not to renew an existing contractual relationship: Deng Jie v Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington Glass 
(1994) (decision of Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court). 
22 It is often asserted that freedom of contract derives from the classical will theory of the post-Enlightenment 
period (Chinese authors make this point, as well as Western commentators: see, for instance, Junwei Fu Modern 
European and Chinese Contract Law: A Comparative Study of Party Autonomy (2011) 55), but Scots law had a 
developed doctrine of the will (voluntas) as the basis of contract by the time of Stair in the late seventeenth 
century. This is often overlooked, by virtue of a focus on English law at the expense of its Northern neighbour. 
23 So, the assertion by Zhang Yuqing and Huang Danhan, in their article ‘The New Contract Law in the People’s 
Republic of China and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: A Brief Comparison 
(2000) 3 Rev dr unif 429 at 431, that Article 4 is much like Article 1.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles (which 
provides that ‘[t]he parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its content’ misses the point that 
Article 4 of the CCL does not mention the parties’ right to determine the content of the contract. 
replaced by the language of ‘voluntarily concluding’ a contract).24 As we shall see, the 
content of Articles 5, 6, and 7 suggest that Chinese contracting parties do not have complete 
freedom to determine the content of their contracts. The interesting question is whether the 
restrictions applicable to freedom of contract in China are any greater than those in modern 
Scotland. 
Although freedom of contract is not specifically protected under Article 4, there are 
decisions of the courts which appear to show a degree of respect for such freedom. So, in a 
case from 2013,25 the SPC held that an agreement as to the payment of engineering costs was 
enforceable, even though this agreement was inconsistent with the findings of a statutory 
audit. The SPC held that the agreement did not violate mandatory provisions of law or 
administrative regulations (as noted earlier, this would have made the contract invalid under 
Article 52), and so was to be enforced according to its terms.  
Lawful intervention with freedom to contract by other parties is permitted: this is 
presumably intended to include courts exercising jurisdiction in relation to disputes about 
contract formation, and to other persons or bodies who may be in a position of authority over 
a putative contracting party.   
It is not entirely clear what the ‘according to law’ caveat adds to this Article: all rights 
are presumably only exercisable pursuant to law, so why need such a caveat be added to this 
particular right? To this observer, if looks as if the answer to why this wording was included 
may be that it was intended either as a reference to a normative understanding that the very 
freedom to contract is a power conferred by the law, or else to serve as a marker to other 
Articles of the CCL which limit the parties’ freedom, albeit that such other articles – for 
instance Articles 3 (equal status), 5 (fairness), and 6 (good faith) – focus more on limitation 
on the freedom of contract rather than freedom to contract. The growth of statutory 
limitations on absolute contractual freedom is taking the Scottish law nearer to the Chinese 
position, and it may be that, in focusing on freedom to (rather than of) contract, the CCL gets 
close to expressing what is the reality of modern contract law in Scotland, especially in the 
consumer field.  
 
Article 5: The parties shall observe the principle of fairness in determining their 
respective rights and duties. 
 
This Article seems to require parties to look not just to their own interests when seeking to 
determine their rights and duties, but to the other parties’ interests too: that at least is the 
implication of a duty to observe a ‘principle of fairness’ in determining the content of 
contracts. It seems thus to make provision for a process which is intended to lead to the result 
specified earlier in Article 3, namely the equality of the parties. Without using the term ‘good 
faith’, both of Article 3 (equality of the parties) and 5 (a fair formation process) could be seen 
as more specific manifestations of such a principle of good faith at the contract formation 
process, though it might have been more logical to place Article 5 (the process) before 
Article 3 (the relational status: equality). By contrast, Article 6 stipulates an explicit 
requirement of good faith at the enforcement stage of the contractual relationship.  
In Article 5’s stipulation of a rule of equitable conduct applicable to the formation of 
contracts, the Article is expressing a rule which also applies, as a result of the doctrine of 
good faith, to the contract formation process in a number of Civilian systems (including 
                                                     
24 Junwei Fu, Modern European and Chinese Contract Law (n 22) 40. 
25 Chongqing Construction Engineering Group Corporation Limited v China Railway 19th Bureau Group Co 
Ltd (20 March 2013), SPC Gazette, Issue 4, 2014. 
Germany, for instance). This sort of rule is not however a rule of Scots law, where equity and 
good faith have a more limited role. As noted earlier under the discussion of Article 3, Scots 
contracting parties are generally entitled to prefer their own position to that of the other 
negotiating party, and, consistent with this, are not seen as being under specific positive 
duties to act fairly when determining each other’s rights and duties (albeit that active 
unfairness is penalised).26 So, there is no general duty resting on negotiating parties to furnish 
the other party with information which it might need in order to come to an informed 
decision on whether or not to enter the contract, or (if so) on what terms.27 By contrast, 
German law imposes duties of disclosure at the negotiation stage (known as 
Ausklärungspflichten). These duties are conceptualised as an aspect of the special 
relationship which comes into existence when parties begin to negotiate a contract, such a 
relationship imposing on the parties a duty ‘to take account of the rights, legal interests and 
other interests of the other party’.28 Such a duty has the appearance of a more extended 
version of the duty of fairness specific in Article 5. The similarities suggest a clear 
connection with the Civilian approach to the relationship between negotiating parties, and 
make for a marked difference with both Scots as well as English law.  
 
Article 6:  The parties shall observe the principle of good faith in the exercise of their 
rights and performance of their duties. 
 
Good faith is a principle which, in the abstract, is of considerable breadth and some 
inexactitude. In Scotland (and elsewhere in the UK) it has often been equated with honesty, 
openness, and fairness. In China it has, in somewhat similar terms, been described as  
incorporating the ‘principle of honesty (chengshi) and faithfulness (xinyong),29 with the 
caveat that it goes far beyond the implications of these two words. The Chinese emphasis on 
faithfulness is entirely understandable, given that it is good faith (fides) which is at issue. 
Arguably, the very nature of contract as a form of obligation can be said necessarily to 
incorporate fidelity: we must be faithful to that to which we are bound in law. Consistent with 
this, there are decisions of the Chinese courts in which an absence of good faith is applied 
simply to describe a breach of contract.30 
The Scottish and Chinese jurisdictional understandings incorporate two perspectives 
of good faith, its subjective perspective (personal honesty) as well as its objective nature 
(adherence to community norms and ethics31). The DCFR combines both perspectives in 
stating that ‘[t]he expression ‘good faith and fair dealing’ refers to a standard of conduct 
characterised by honesty, openness and consideration for the interests of the other party to the 
                                                     
26 Active unfairness is prevented by means of the doctrines discussed earlier under discussion of Article 3 (e.g. 
misrepresentation, extortion, etc.), but the law has not yet developed much beyond this stage.     
27 UK law has limited, targeted duties in relation to the provision of information, for instance in consumer credit 
contract and insurance contracts. 
28 BGB §241(2). The DCFR contains more specific duties requiring the provision of information by business 
parties: see DCFR, II.-3:101 ff. 
29 Ling, Contract Law (n 15) 52. 
30 See, for instance, the judgment of the Intermediate People’s Court of Tianjin Municipality in Liming v Zhu 
Jinhua and Li Shaohua (26 December 1994), SPC Gazette, Issue 2, 1995, in which a refusal to pay a 
contractually stipulated reward was described as in violation of the principle of good faith. 
31 For instance, trade practices can form the standard of good faith to which a party is required to adhere: see 
Beijing Zhongrui Cultural Co Ltd v Beijing Zero Market Investigation & Analysis Co Ltd (17 December 1998), 
SPC Gazette, Issue 3, 1999. 
transaction or relationship in question’.32 As is the case in the DCFR,33 the Article 6 duty is 
framed as an absolute one, unable to be modified or excluded by the parties.  
The status and role of good faith in Scots contract law is a matter of uncertainty and 
debate. While in a Scottish appeal to the House of Lords reference was made to ‘the broad 
principle in the field of contract law of fair dealing in good faith’,34 this statement has not 
found much explicit support in later Scottish case law; on the contrary, one judge (Lord 
Glennie) recently said that ‘it is, of course, no part of Scots law that, in the absence of 
agreement, parties to a contract should act in good faith in carrying out their obligations to 
each other’.35 The truth probably lies somewhere between these two positions: good faith in 
Scots law may be seen as a principle capable of explaining and connecting existing contract 
rules and doctrine, but its active role (in creating new duties or rules) is limited, albeit, as 
Lord Glennie says, that parties may expressly frame their duties by reference to good faith.  
 Article 6 of the CCL goes further than existing Scots (and English) law in embedding 
good faith at the performance/enforcement stage into contract law; the Scottish courts have 
seldom given any signs that they are willing to accept that parties are implicitly constrained 
in the exercise of their rights and duties by reference to good faith. Thus, in the famous 
decision of White & Carter (Councils) v Macgregor,36 a contracting party was held by the 
House of Lords to be entitled to tender a performance which the other party had indicated it 
no longer wanted and to claim the price for so doing. One may debate whether such an 
entitlement is contrary to the principle of good faith (it has certainly been argued to be so), 
but the decision remains good law at the present time. On the other hand, a less formalistic 
approach is discernible in Lindley Catering Co v Hibernian Football Club,37 in which the 
judge expressed the obiter view that, if a breach of contract is remediable, the victim of the 
breach must give the party in breach a second chance to remedy the defect (an approach 
which equates to the second chance or ‘Nachfrist’ rule of German law38). Such a view could 
be said to reflect the idea that contractual remedies must be exercised in good faith. 
Admittedly, this was only a first instance judgment, and an appeal level court has not 
definitively expressed a view on the matter. The safer view is that the Lindley Catering good 
faith based limitation on termination cannot be taken to represent the definitive view of Scots 
law, and that contractual rights must be taken to be exercisable in an unrestrictive fashion, 
unless agreed otherwise. 
 Potential weaknesses in Article 6 are its inherent vagueness and its uncertain 
interaction with other articles. One can of course point out that the terms of Article 6 
specifically apply good faith to the exercise of rights and the performance of duties: the 
enunciation of such a specific role makes it easier to delineate the concept of good faith. But 
does the specification of this role mean that good faith has no role to play outside of the 
article? Arguably (and it has been so argued earlier), other provisions within the CCL can be 
seen as more specific crystallisations of the good faith principle39– Articles 3 (equality of 
status) and 5 (fairness in the formation process) – and some undoubtedly are so, in that they 
                                                     
32 DCFR I.-1:103(1). 
33 DCFR, III.-1:103(2). 
34 The comments of Lord Clyde in Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 111. 
35 Remarks of Lord Glennie in EDI Central Ltd v National Car Parks Ltd [2010] CSOH 141, at para 23.  
36 [1961] UKHL 5, 1962 SC (HL) 1, [1962] AC 413. 
37 1975 SLT (Notes) 56. 
38 See §323 BGB. 
39 This view has been advocated by Chinese commentators too: see, for instance, Li Wei, ‘On the Principle of 
Good Faith in Contract Law’ (1999) Journal of the Southwest University of Political Science and the Law (issue 
2) 31 (‘新《 合同法 》不仅将诚实信用原则规定为合同订立和履行的基本原则，更重要的是在合同法的
总则和分则特别是总则中的许多条款中都规定诚实信用原则的具体适用规则’). 
expressly mention good faith: these include Article 42 (the rough equivalent of the Civilian 
idea of culpa in contrahendo) and Article 60, the latter providing that ‘[t]he parties shall 
observe the principle of good faith and perform such duties as giving notice, providing 
assistance and maintaining confidentiality in accordance with the nature and purpose of the 
contract as well as the usage of transaction’. Yet, despite the generality of Article 6, most 
performance/enforcement articles in the CCL do not mention good faith. So, for instance, 
good faith is not mentioned in relation to performance towards a third party (Article 64), 
suspension of performance (Article 68), or refusal by the creditor of partial performance 
(Article 72). Is the absence of a good faith requirement in those provisions to be taken as a 
sign that what they stipulate or permit is not subject to the requirement of good faith? Or does 
Article 6 nonetheless reach into those provisions too? There is ambiguity here, which is 
unfortunate.  
 
Article 7: When concluding and performing contracts, the parties shall comply with 
laws and administrative regulations and respect public morals, and they shall not 
disturb the social and economic order or harm the public interest. 
 
This provision of the CCL has a lot packed into it, some of it being uncontroversial from a 
Scottish perspective, but other portions going further than Scots law.  
There is no doubt that Scottish contracting parties must abide by the law (whether in 
the form of statutory rules, or rules deriving from secondary legislative instruments) in 
making and performing contracts. But a breach of the law by a contracting party may have 
one of a number of effects: it may render a contract unenforceable, if the doctrine of illegality 
is engaged; it may render the contract void or voidable; or it may have no effect on the 
contract at all. The first result (unenforceability) would obtain if, for instance, the contract 
was to do something illegal (e.g. to smuggle goods across a customs border); the second 
result (voidness or voidability) would obtain if the contract was tainted by some 
reprehensible conduct directed towards the other party, e.g. if extortion was present (the 
contract would be void) or a party was subject to undue influence or misrepresentation (the 
contract would be voidable); the third result would obtain if the breach of the law was merely 
tangential to the performance of the contract (e.g. if it transpired that, in delivering goods to a 
buyer, the seller had been exceeding the speed limit in its delivery vehicle). Some of the law 
surrounding these issues is muddled and in need of restatement (e.g. the rules on illegality), 
while other parts are settled and not in much, if any, doubt. It is striking that Article 7 says 
nothing about which effect results from specific breaches of laws or regulations. In fact, later 
provisions of the law address the issue of specific defects and their results. Article 52 
prescribes a single effect – voidness – where any of the following pertain: (1) where a party 
uses fraud or duress to conclude the contract, thereby harming the interests of the state; (2) 
where it involves malicious collusion to harm the interests of the state, a collective 
organisation or a third person; (3) where it conceals an illegal purpose in a lawful form; (4) 
where it violates the public interest; or (5) where it violates mandatory provisions of laws or 
administrative regulations. Article 7 thus has the appearance of a general expression of 
principle, the practical effects of which are worked out later in the law. 
 The reference in the Article to ‘public morals’ is worthy of note. To a limited extent, 
public morality is taken account of in Scots contract law. Contracts which are contra bones 
mores (against good morals) are (like contracts tainted with illegality) unenforceable, that is 
to say they strictly exist but neither party gains any enforceable rights under them. Gambling 
contracts used to be one example of such contracts, but the law was changed in 2005 to make 
them enforceable.40 Another example is contracts of prostitution, which remain 
unenforceable. The idea of subject matter which is contra bonos mores is evidently a 
culturally and temporally specific one, as the legitimation of gambling indicates. As a 
concept for controlling socially unacceptable conduct, there is the danger that it can be used 
to persecute conduct which, though disapproved of by authority, is not objectively harmful.41 
In the wrong hands therefore, it could be an oppressive doctrine used to prohibit conduct 
which may not be contrary to any express provisions of the law. It does not feature in much, 
if any, modern Scottish case law, suggesting that its importance has greatly diminished over 
time.  
As for parties not disturbing the social and economic order or harming the public 
interest, these strike me as remarkably vague ideas. What is the ‘social and economic order’, 
and how might it be disrupted? If it means state socialism, then one might have thought that 
any private contractual relationships could arguably disrupt such order, but that can clearly 
no longer be so or there would be no CCL of the sort under examination. Of course, all legal 
systems have laws which target specific conduct deemed to be contrary to the good 
functioning of society or economy: rules against insider dealing, and anti-trust regimes, are 
two examples. But the specificity of these rules is what gives them a sphere of certain 
application. A rule of the sort in Article 7 strikes me as too vague to provide any benefit that 
does not carry with it the danger of being used repressively. Again, what is the ‘public 
interest’? It might conceivably extend to consumer protection, but again one would expect 
specific rules to be developed to afford such protection; the all-encompassing phrase used in 
Article 7 seems far too much of a blunt instrument. A more specific rule is needed to ensure 
that parties can act with legal certainty when undertaking transactions and structuring their 
affairs.  
 
Article 8: Contracts concluded according to law are legally binding on the parties.  The 
parties shall perform their respective duties in accordance with the agreement and may 
not unilaterally modify or terminate the contract. 
 
Contracts concluded according to law are protected by law. 
 
As a preliminary observation, it is not clear to me what the second statement – ‘Contracts 
concluded according to law are protected by law’ – adds to what has already been said earlier 
in the Article. The first stated rule of the article, that ‘contracts concluded according to law 
are legally binding on the parties’, would seem to have precisely the effect of legally 
protecting such contracts. The later statement thus seems to do no more than paraphrase what 
has already been said, and could I think easily be dispensed with. Indeed, more broadly, the 
CCL as a whole is an instrument which protects lawfully concluded contracts.  
 As to the initial statement, conferring binding force on lawfully concluded contracts, 
this is an uncontroversial basic statement of the normative force of contracts, one reflected in 
Western legal systems in the maxim pacta sunt servanda (contracts are enforced). In the way 
in which it is specifically framed, however, it can be argued that the CCL locates the 
normative force of contracts in the legislative will: the legal force of a contract does not 
                                                     
40 See Gambling Act 2005, s 335. 
41 In this regard, the case of X v Y, a decision of the Naxi District People's Court, Luzhou, Sichuan Province, 
from 2001 (Naxi Minchuzi No 561), discussed by Professor Han in his chapter of this work, may be noted: the 
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depend on the will of the parties, rather the consent of the parties to be bound at law is met 
with the response by the state that the contract is to be afforded validity and enforcement. The 
parties’ wills are thus the mechanism by which contracts come into being in Chinese law, but 
their normative force derives from the will of the legislator, of the people one might say in 
communitarian fashion. This is not so different to what can be said of Scots law: I have 
previously argued that the only defensible view of the role of the will in modern contract law, 
in an era when so much of the content of contracts derives from default rules and implied 
terms at law, is to see it as the mechanism through which contracts become enforceable, 
rather than as their normative source.42 Parties consent to the imposition of contractual 
obligations on them by the law. On this view, Scots and Chinese contract law can agree.  
 The Article specifies that only the parties are legally bound by their agreement. This 
is consistent with the principle of privity (or relativity) of contract, also applied in Scots law. 
As an exception to the privity rule, in Scots law the conferral of directly enforceable rights 
upon extra-contractual third parties is generally permissible; under the CCL, the position is 
more convoluted, Article 64 only providing that failure to perform in favour of a third party 
makes the debtor liable ‘to the creditor’ (i.e. the other contracting party) for such breach. 
Academic views are that third parties do have the right to demand such performance 
themselves,43 but the status of this position as mere academic opinion is unsatisfactory.  
As for parties being ‘required to perform their respective duties’, this is a certainly a 
view consistent with Scots law, which places a high value on performance. In Scotland, 
specific implement (the equivalent remedy to specific performance in the Common law) is an 
ordinary contractual remedy, not an exceptional or equitable one, and the primary measure of 
contract damages is one which equates to the performance interest (and includes recovery of 
both damnum emergens and lucram cessans).  
As for parties not ‘unilaterally’ modifying or terminating the contract, no contracting 
party may unilaterally modify a contract in Scots law, unless the contract gives it the power 
to do so; however, if a contract does confer a right of unilateral modification, then such a 
power can generally be exercised strictly according to its terms (in cases of doubt, an 
ambiguity would be likely to be read against the interests of the party which had been 
responsible for the drafting of the power). There is some protection however against 
unilateral modifications permitted under the contract: if the power conferred were to be 
deemed an unfair term, it might be struck down under either the applicable provisions of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 or of Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.  
As to unilateral termination of a contract in Scots law, this is again permitted if the 
contract gives a party that power (though unfair terms law is also applicable to such a power, 
and may thus strike it down in some cases) or as a justified response to a material breach of 
contract by the other party (when it is often styled ‘rescission’). In the CCL, unilateral 
termination is permitted in the circumstances specified in Article 94; otherwise, the Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC) has held unilateral termination not to be permissible.44 The right to 
rescind a contract granted under Article 94 must, unless a specified time limit is agreed, be 
                                                     
42 See Martin Hogg, ‘Competing Theories of Contract: An Emerging Consensus?’ in Larry DiMatteo et al, 
Commercial Contract Law: Transatlantic Perspectives (2013). 
43 See further Bing Ling, Contract Law (n 15) 254. 
44 See Chengdu Xunjie Communications Chain Co Ltd v Sichuan Shudu Industrial Co Ltd. and Sichuan Youli 
Investment Holding Co Ltd (14 November 2013), SPC Gazette, Issue 1, 2015. The SPC has however also held 
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v Shandong Juye County Hengjie Environmental Protection Equipment Manufacturing Co Ltd (1 February 
2009), SPC. 
exercised with a reasonable time (Article 95);45 Scots law takes a similar view. The 
reasonable time stipulation of Article 95 has the appearance of a crystallisation of the more 
general rule of Article 8 against arbitrary termination as well as of the principle of good faith 
embodied in Article 6.  
There is English case law supporting the view that discretionary powers granted to 
parties under contract must be exercised in a genuine, rational, and not arbitrary fashion,46 
and such a view would also be taken in Scotland. In terms of default remedies given to 
parties, including the common law power to terminate a contract, this can only be exercised if 
the other party is in material breach of contract, a material breach being one which goes ‘to 
the root of the contract’.47 This restriction can be seen as moderating harsh or excessive 
exercise of a right to terminate, and is one of the features of the default rules of Scots law 
which have been argued to reflect a principle of good faith. We have also seen how at least 
one case suggests that parties which have committed a remediable breach of contract should 
be given the right to remedy the breach, though this rule is of very doubtful status.  
In sum, the Scots law approach does not equate to a general prohibition against 
unilateral modification or termination, but there are more targeted rules which regulate 
specific instances of such conduct. 
 
C. Conclusion on the overall character of the general principles of the CCL 
 
What ought a Scots lawyer to conclude about the general rules (Articles 1 to 8) of the general 
provisions of the CCL?  
 First, taken at face value, they do seem to represent a mixture of Common law and 
Civil law, with a nod to ‘socialist modernisation’. The last of these is only referred to 
explicitly once in the CCL, and from what I can tell does not feature regularly (if at all) as a 
reference point in the decisions of the courts. That being the case, it’s hard to see what real 
impact socialist modernisation as a value can be expected to have on contract law (though 
Article 3’s notion of the equality of parties might be claimed to be representative of the spirit 
of socialism).  
Of the general articles discussed above, some embody principles or rules found in 
both Civil and Common law: contract as agreement (Art. 2); freedom to contract (Art. 4); 
compliance with laws and public morals (Art. 7); and no unilateral modification or 
termination (Art. 8). One is clearly more reflective of Civilian ideas, that concerning good 
faith (Art. 6). None are especially redolent of Common law ideas, though (as noted earlier) 
some of the later provisions in the CCL are so. One article might be interpreted as going 
further than either existing Civil or Common law rules, namely Article 3 in its stipulation that 
parties are ‘equal in their legal status’, though it has been noted that there is a view that this 
article is in fact doing no more than saying that parties have an equal right to compete in the 
marketplace. The further aspect of Article 3 (that ‘no party may impose his own will upon the 
other party’) to some extent already reflects rules of the Common and Civil law, though as an 
unqualified and more general-in-scope rule, it has the potential for a more radical impact on 
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Trade World Co Ltd (31 January 2013), SPC Gazette, Issue 10, 2013.  
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EWCA Civ 151. 
47 Wade v Waldon 1909 SC 571 at 576. There are other, similar formulations, for instance that a material breach 
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contractual arrangements than the more targeted rules of Western legal systems relating to 
unconscionable and unfair advantage-taking. The same can be said of Article 5’s prescription 
of fairness in party conduct.  
In general, as an outside observer of Chinese Contract Law it is difficult to gauge to 
what extent the law on paper reflects practice. It has been observed that, while the rules of the 
CCL mirror European legal principles, behind those rules lie traditional Confucian ethics 
(including the principle of yi, righteousness, which equates to some extent with the Western 
notion of justice48) as well as Chinese cultural practices such as that of guanxi, or ‘mutual 
obligation, reciprocity, goodwill and personal connection’,49 which can (to outside eyes) be 
perceived as favouritism of a sort deprecated in Western legal culture. That is not to say that 
Western contractual practice necessarily equates exactly to contract rules: relational contract 
theory has taught us that business people may ignore contract terms or their enforcement in 
favour of preserving the contractual relationship over the longer term. But the suspicion 
remains that favouritism in Chinese law, and the consequent divergence of law and reality, 
may be much greater in China than it is in the West, including in Scotland. 
Some might worry that the very general principles embodied in the first eight articles 
have the potential to provide courts with the means to disrupt the agreements of parties as 
well as the later more specific rules of the CCL: statements that parties are ‘equal’ in status, 
may not ‘impose’ their will on each other, and must act ‘fairly’ in determining their rights 
and duties, delineate what are, prima facie, very sweeping, uncertain propositions and 
standards of conduct.50 However, it seems that the Chinese courts have not permitted these 
potentially very disruptive general norms to run roughshod over party intentions or to disrupt 
the more focused later rules of the CCL. Rather, they are seen as a means to interpret later 
provisions of the Law, and serve (as do similar general provisions in European Civil Codes) 
to provide inspiration when the courts have to deal with gaps in the code. This is testified to 
by Professor Han, who remarks in his chapter in this book that the general principles function 
as keys to assist in interpreting the more specific later rules of the CCL as well as the means 
to supplement gaps in the CCL.51 This is consistent with the approach taken to general 
principles in codified Civilian and mixed legal systems.  
Much of what the general principles prescribe is not dissimilar to the content of 
general rules in the UNIDROIT Principles, the DCFR, and the PECL, principles which are 
increasingly familiar to Scottish lawyers. Many of the general principles are also, as has been 
seen, comparable to rules of Scots law (with a few exceptions commented on above), though 
often these rules are more targeted in nature. A Scots lawyer will certainly not feel on 
unfamiliar territory in reading Articles 1 to 8 of the CCL, as a desire for foundational, general 
principles of contract law is one of the marks of a Civilian heritage shared by both the PRC 
and Scotland.   
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